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I. Introduction 
Under international law refugee status is granted to those who fall within the 
definition of a refugee under the Refugee Convention 1951.1 The Convention, 
however, does not implement any mechanisms which directly implement its 
principles. It is therefore up to the State to ensure that refugee rights are 
implemented directly. James Hathaway suggests two mechanisms to implement 
the Convention, namely solution-oriented temporary protection and shared 
responsibility among states, in order to safeguard practical access to meaningful 
asylum, but acknowledging that any system must take into account the self-
interests of states and so must establish effective control systems and to minimize 
risks.2 Although discussion on such proposals is beyond the ambit of this work, it 
is important as it shows that in the absence of any implementing or remedial 
mechanisms under the Convention, it is important to have a system which 
effectively balances the access to asylum with the interests of the State in keeping 
the risks and numbers of asylum seekers low. 
As there are no real mechanisms of enforceability, refugee law has fallen out of 
favour due to the lack of mechanisms which achieve its fundamental purpose of 
balancing the rights of asylum seekers and those of the state.3 An attempt was 
made with the adoption of the Procedures Directive on the minimum procedural 
guarantees pertaining to the granting and withdrawal of refugee status in Europe 
(“the Directive”).4 It was implemented in the Netherlands on 1 December 2007. 
The Directive is limited to the minimum standards for such guarantees afforded 
under the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees.5 It was enacted as 
part of an effort to create a Common European Asylum System envisioned in the 
Tampere Conclusions. It is the main enactment on asylum procedure. However, 
the Directive is not clear enough as it sets the standards too low or does not 
mention necessary safeguards, leaving most of the discretion with the Member 
State instead, and this has allowed national practices to diverge. 
                                                
1 Article 1(A)(2) Refugee Convention 1951. 
2 James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve “Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: 
A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection” (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 115 at 151. 
3 At 116. 
4 Directive 2005/85 (OJ 2005 L 326/13). 
5 Article 3. 
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The Dutch approach is one of the most restrictive in the European Union; a 
policy which is justified by the Dutch government by the volume of asylum 
seekers it receives each year. The number of asylum applications is very high – 
14,465 applications per month were received in 2006, which was the lowest figure 
in ten years.6 However, that number has recently increased again from 1,000 in 
February and March 2014 to around 1,000 in a week in May 2014.7 With such 
high numbers of asylum seekers arriving at the borders, the Dutch population has 
also urged for tough asylum procedures with often strong Islamophobic 
undertones, since most asylum seekers to the Netherlands originate from Islamic 
countries. This was particularly the case after the assassinations of radical 
politician Pim Fortuyn and filmmaker Theo van Gogh, who were both very 
outspoken anti-Islam. This sentiment was very popular and in the aftermath of the 
assassinations, 63 per cent of Dutch citizens felt that radical Muslims should have 
been deported.8 It is therefore unsurprising the Dutch government have been able 
to enact such strict asylum procedures.  
II. Article 3 European Convention on Human Rights 
The Dutch policy is part of a wider EU trend of Member States to divert or deter 
asylum seekers from their borders. In particular, the use of summary exclusion 
procedures, such as a special procedure applicable at the border at reception 
centres as well as wide-ranging categories of exclusion procedures, are often used, 
often in addition to requiring refugees to repatriate while a risk of persecution 
remains in their home country. Such procedures risk a breach of the non-
refoulement provision. Therefore, some analysis of Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is appropriate here. 
Article 3 of the ECHR restates the absolute prohibition of torture proviso into 
European Union law. It requires that no one must be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In the context of asylum 
                                                
6 Immigration and Naturalization Department (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst) Annual Report 
on Asylum and Migration Statistics in the Netherlands: Reference Period 2007 (September 2009) 
at 7.  
7 Dutch News “Parliament Holds Emergency Debate over Surge in Asylum Seekers” Dutch News 
(online ed, the Netherlands, 15 May 2014). 
8 Carl Levy “The European Union after 9/11: The Demise of a Liberal Democratic Asylum 
Regime?” (2005) 40 Government and Opposition 26 at 38. 
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applications, a breach of Article 3 might be argued when a claim of asylum is 
rejected and expulsion of the asylum seeker risks their return to their home 
country where they are at risk of being subjected to such ill-treatment. Article 15 
ECHR provides that Article 3 is an absolute prohibition and therefore there is no 
justification under international law or under the ECHR for breaching that 
provision.9 It is part of a wider obligation placed on Member States. In fact, it is 
long-established principle that liability is imposed on Member States when it is 
removing persons when there is a sufficiently high risk that treatment in the 
receiving state will fall short of ECHR standards.10 The leading case of Soering v 
United Kingdom has been held that Article 3 requires a ‘real risk’ of ill-treatment, 
which is not equivalent to certain or probable ill-treatment.11 Instead even a small 
risk could suffice as long as it is a real risk.  
The Procedures Directive acknowledges the inderogable character of Article 3 
in its provision that all applications must be considered under its basic safeguards, 
which reduces the likelihood of refoulement or a possible breach of Article 3. One 
such safeguard is that Member States should not reject or exclude applications on 
the grounds that they were not made as soon as possible,12 meaning that 
applications cannot ipso facto be thrown out due to time limits and thus requiring 
States to have regard to the reasons for an application as well as procedural 
matters. This Article is, however, “without prejudice” to Article 23(4)(i) which 
states that Member States can consider an application “unfounded”, in other 
words, the application would never have succeeded, if the applicant has failed 
without reasonable cause to make their application earlier, where he or she had the 
opportunity to do so. Such a provision clearly recognizes a State’s prerogative in 
enacting such procedures and requiring applicants to comply with them where 
possible. In order to ensure that such applications are not treated differently, or 
can be used by the State as a simply exclusionary category, even those 
applications deemed “unfounded” must be examined using the basic procedural 
                                                
9 Ireland v United Kingdom EComHR 18 January 1978, Series B no.23-I. 
10 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 ECHR 439, Judgment of 7 July 1989. 
11 Judgement 7 July 1989, Series A, vol. 161 at [99]. 
12 Procedures Directive, Article 6. 
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standards as set out in Chapter II of the Directive.13 This would then require most 
applications to be examined “individually, objectively and impartially”.14  
However, it is regrettable that the Directive makes no explicit mention of the 
ECHR or any other instruments of international human rights law, and so it is 
unclear whether the Directive is subsidiary to those other instruments. Instead, it 
invites Member States to apply the Directive itself in procedures when deciding 
on applications for any kind of international protection.15 Peers and Rogers point 
out that notwithstanding this provision Member States would still be bound to 
ECHR standards when interpreting the Directive due to the status enjoyed by the 
ECHR and case law of the European Court of Human Rights as an important 
source of EU law.16 The Directive, however, would have benefitted from having 
this expressly stated.  
III. The Interview 
A. The interviewing process under EU law 
The interview is of integral importance. This is particularly the case because the 
Directive does not provide any safeguards for an asylum seeker to provide their 
story or any information in the absence of that interview. As opposed to other 
areas of the asylum procedure, the Directive has set out some clear procedural 
requirements for the interview process for Member States to abide by. As general 
rules, the requirements contained in Article 8 of the directive apply during the 
interviewing process, which contain obligations to examine the applications 
“individually, objectively and impartially” and to ensure that decision makers 
have the appropriate expertise to examine applications in that manner. It is this 
requirement that is crucial to the conducting of any interview and guaranteeing the 
rights of the applicant.  
The particular duties with regards to personal interviews are contained in 
Articles 12 and 13. Article 12 requires that all asylum applicants are to be 
                                                
13 Steve Peers and Nicola Rogers (eds) EU Asylum Law: Text and Commentary (vol. 12, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2006) at 368. 
14 Procedures Directive, Article 8. 
15 Procedures Directive, Article 3(4). 
16 Peers and Rogers, above n 13, at 381. 
7 
 
interviewed as part of the asylum application, albeit with a number of exceptions. 
Article 13 requires Member States to take appropriate steps to ensure the 
interview is conducted in a manner which allows an applicant to “present the 
grounds for their application in a comprehensive manner”, which obliges a 
Member State to ensure the interviewer is competent to take into account personal 
or general circumstances, including the applicant’s cultural origin or vulnerability, 
and to ensure that an interpreter is selected to allow “appropriate communication”. 
Article 13 does not require this communication to necessarily be in the applicant’s 
preferred language but may be a language which “he/she may reasonably be 
supposed to understand and in which he/she is able to communicate”. 
Additionally, Article 15 provides the right to legal assistance for those interviews. 
However, the requirement for legal representation to be present during the 
interview is noticeably absent from the Directive.  
B. Interview in Dutch Asylum Law 
In the Netherlands, the interview procedure is governed by the Aliens Act 2000 
with some further regulations and decrees under that Act. Under both the quick 
and normal procedure for considering claims for asylum, there are only two 
interviews. There is also a rest period of six days afforded under both the normal 
and quicker procedure. These two interviews are undertaken by an official from 
the Immigration and Naturalization Department (IND) after that rest period. The 
first of the two interviews, which occurs on the first day of the process, is merely 
concerned with the asylum seeker’s identity, nationality and travel route.17 A legal 
adviser may be present during this interview, but rarely is.18 It is not entirely clear 
why this occurs, but could be due to the fact that legal representatives are able to 
attend the interview but cannot question the applicant or interfere during the 
meeting.19 Thus, the use of legal representation during the interview might be 
limited. This can be at odds with the importance of the first interview. Although it 
is often viewed by lawyers and judges as a short intake merely concerned with the 
                                                
17 Aliens Regulation 2000, Article 3.44.  
18 Joukje van Rooij Asylum Procedure versus Human Rights (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam, 2004) at 3. 
19 Nienke Doornbos “On Being Heard in Asylum Cases: Evidentiary Assessment through Asylum 
Interviews” in Noll, Gregor (ed) Proof: Evidentiary Assessment And Credibility In Asylum 
Procedures (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2005) at 111. 
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formalities of the case, it practically plays a significant role in establishing the 
credibility of the claim and the statements made in that first interview are often 
referred to in subsequent decisions made on that claim.20 
In no fewer than three days after an application has been submitted, a second, 
more detailed interview is undertaken which forms the basis for the application as 
the asylum seeker can explain his or her reasons in detail for requesting asylum.21 
This system allows for the speedy consideration of a claim, for the majority of 
claims are able to be resolved quickly where there is clear evidence that an asylum 
seeker has suffered a qualifying fear or trauma capable of the granting of refugee 
status or not. However, it has been suggested that this process is flawed in several 
ways because when this procedure is applied to cases which require individual 
consideration due to specific circumstances or difficulty presented by the asylum 
seeker’s account, this procedure often fails to be able to bring out such concerns 
in the interview.  
An asylum seeker is expected to present a coherent, reliable account of events 
within a short amount of time after arrival into the Netherlands which can be 
unrealistic in some cases. There can be significant factors which can prevent an 
asylum seeker feeling secure in providing their full story, mostly due to trauma, 
fear of endangering others by doing so or shame. As the asylum decision relies 
solely on the individual observation of the interviewing officer only, there is a real 
risk that if a person is prevented from telling their story fully, that this is instead 
classed as denial and will not be included in the officer’s account of the 
interview.22 In fact, the very reason why a person is seeking asylum often falls 
within those categories and so having only two interviews given to the asylum 
seeker might not be sufficient to draw out the full story if the person is scared, 
traumatized or ashamed of doing so, especially when there are no exceptions to 
this rule. The rest period of six days cannot provide a sufficient buffer in such 
circumstances. Joukje van Rooij rightly points out that particularly in the case of 
sexual violence or other forms of trauma, subsequent interviews might be 
necessary to allow for a relationship of trust to be established and to gather all 
                                                
20 At 110. 
21 Aliens Decree 2000, Article 3.111.  
22 Janus Oomen “Torture Narratives and the Burden of Giving Evidence in the Dutch Asylum 
Procedure” 5(3) 2007 Intervention 250 at 251. 
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relevant information that might not be revealed during those two interviews.23 
This is a required requirement, as a subsequent application can only be made on 
new facts or circumstances which could not be adduced at an earlier stage.24 The 
Council of State, the district court which deals with appeals from asylum 
applications, has expressly stated that it does not matter that those facts or 
circumstances could not be adduced due to language problems25, fear to endanger 
family members26, shame or psychological problems27. Thus, an asylum seeker 
has no other avenue for redress if they do not state their full story during the two 
interviews when they were operating under the above circumstances. 
 
C. Does Dutch interviewing procedure comply with EU law? 
1. The Procedures Directive and Dutch interviewing procedure 
In light of the requirements as stated by the Directive, the Dutch system of 
interviewing procedures can be criticized for not placing enough emphasis on any 
substantive individual examination in the interview under Article 8 of the 
Directive. This can be the case as a testimony may be inconsistent, incredible or 
even untruthful at times and the process marked with cultural and linguistic 
misunderstandings, but still have merit.28 It is therefore unsatisfactory to merely 
claim a story is inconsistent and consequently reject it.  
It is therefore a just recommendation to prevent victims of serious physical or 
psychological problems at the time of the interview, or other people exhibiting 
symptoms of trauma, to be admitted to the full procedure instead of the 
accelerated procedure.29 
Interviewing officers have been left with considerable discretion under the 
Directive and Dutch asylum procedure on how to conduct an interview. Article 
13(3)(a) of the Directive merely provides that officers should be properly trained 
and should have the appropriate expertise required to undertake an individual 
                                                
23 Van Rooij, above n 18, at 24.  
24 General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht; Awb) 1994, Article 4:6(1). 
25 Raad van State 5 September 2001, JV 2001/285 and NAV 2001/315-kort. 
26 Raad van State 5 March 2002, JV 2002/124. 
27 Raad van State 28 June 2002, JV 2002/294 and Raad van State 16 July 2002, JV 2002/304. 
28 Cathryn Costello The European Asylum Procedures Directive in Legal Context (United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, November 2006) at 2.  
29 Human Rights Watch Fleeting Refuge: The Triumph of Efficiency over Protection in Dutch 
Asylum Policy (Human Rights Watch, April 2003), at 3. 
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assessment of each claim. The Netherlands has thus devised its own rules, but 
these have resulted in discrepancies between interviews. Nienke Doornbos has 
demonstrated the discrepancies which occur in Dutch interviews due to a lack of 
proper training of officers. She documents that an interviewing officer will usually 
start the second interview with a repetition of questions from the first interview or 
a confrontation of any contradictory or vague statements that were made by the 
asylum seeker, while the second interview is to be characterized by ‘free 
reproduction’, meaning that the asylum seeker should be given the opportunity to 
speak freely about their motives.30 This means that in certain cases, some asylum 
seekers would be allowed more time and space to explain their story than others 
would. It also reveals that some officers might have pre-existing ideas about the 
genuineness of a claim for asylum before the interview begins, with some forming 
the view quite early on that the claim is not genuine or that the asylum seeker is 
an economic migrant instead, which means that the atmosphere in which that 
interview is conducted would differ. Indeed the lack of receptivity and 
responsibility taken for the situation or the individual’s needs due to preconceived 
frames of thought or stereotypical assumptions made by the interviewer means 
that an asylum seeker is reduced to a number, rather than an individual.31 
Doornbos also notes serious communication problems during the interview, often 
in a combination of the role and behaviour of the officer, including a lack of 
experience, cultural or political knowledge on the part of the interviewing officer, 
questions did not connect with the asylum seeker’s knowledge, the speed of 
questioning was too fast or the officer was jumping from one subject to another.32  
2. The ECHR and Dutch interviewing procedure 
Hatami v Sweden has held that the rejection of an asylum seeker’s application due 
to apparent inconsistencies in their story resulting from the interview conducted 
with inadequate interpretation and culminating in a short report without any detail 
and not explained to the applicant was a breach of Article 3 as it was an 
inadequate procedural safeguard.33 Additionally, it is also clear that in order to 
avoid liability under Article 3 here the authorities are required to focus more on 
                                                
30 Nienke Doornbos, above n 19, at 114. 
31 Suzanne Metselaar, “When Neighbours Become Numbers: Levinas and the Inhospitality of 
Dutch Asylum Policy” 11(1) Parallax 2005 61 at 65. 
32 Nienke Doornbos, above n 19, at 119. 
33 Report, 23 April 1998 (unreported). 
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the applicant’s statements about threat of torture from their history, political views 
or ill-treatment.34 Hatami also contended that complete accuracy in an applicant’s 
account is to be seldom expected with victims of torture.35 This clearly suggests 
the ECHR will not rule against a lack of credibility of an applicant regarding their 
transit if there was still a sufficiently sound argument that a risk under Article 3 
would occur if the person was to return to their home country.  
IV. Subsequent Application 
A. Subsequent application under EU law 
Article 32 of the Directive makes it plain that Member States can make provision 
for special procedures to deal with subsequent applications. An important 
question that has come up is whether documents that could have been produced at 
the first hearing are appropriate grounds for appeal or a subsequent application.  
This does not seem to be a determinative factor in of itself under European 
Union case law. The House of Lords in Hilal v United Kingdom has held that 
whether a document could have been produced at an earlier stage is not of 
overriding importance.36 Mr. Hilal had not disclosed during his first interview that 
he had been arrested and tortured, but mentioned it in his full interview. After his 
application had been rejected, he provided supporting documentation for his 
application, namely his brother’s death certificate and a medical report about his 
treatment while detained, but these documents were rejected by the Secretary of 
State as they could have been produced earlier and as such cast doubt over his 
application. However, the court placed little significance on the issue that it had 
been adduced later on and instead focused more on the documents and what they 
proved and so held that the documents should be admitted.  
The Court will make its own judgement as to whether deportation would be 
contrary to Article 3, so it is only logical that the Court may consider evidence 
which was not known to the respondent State at the time it decided on 
deportation, and the Court’s case law elucidates that it finds the moment at which 
                                                
34 Peers and Rogers, above n 13, at 382. 
35 Report, 23 April 1998 (unreported) at [96]-[109]. This is in line with the position held by the 
UN Committee Against Torture as held in decisions like Haydin v Switzerland, Communication 
no. 101/1997; or Tala v Sweden, Communication No. 43/1996. 
36 ECHR 6 March 2001, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001-II. 
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evidence was submitted as immaterial as long as it is reliable.37 However, this 
does not mean that the Court will not pay attention to the time a statement was 
made or when the evidence was submitted, but it considers it instead in an 
exclusively substantive, as opposed to formal, manner.38 The automatic and 
mechanical application of domestic procedural rules should not deny the asylum 
seeker a realistic opportunity to prove their claim to asylum. As Thomas 
Spijkerboer suggests, the prohibition contained in Article 3, which is jus cogens, 
and this may have priority over any procedural autonomy of States where there 
might be concern that the decision to deport might be in contravention of Article 
3.39  
 
B. Subsequent applications: the Dutch Approach 
Under Dutch law, the court cannot reverse IND decisions but only judge, on the 
basis of ‘new’ documents, that the IND did not follow its own instructions and 
then allow a subsequent application for asylum. As such, the IND has the 
authority to simply dismiss a repeated application by referring to its earlier 
decision, when the asylum seeker does not make a reasonable case for new facts 
or circumstances.40 However, the IND does not easily find that a document is 
‘new’. The Council of State has held that information relating to trauma-related 
events, torture or other experiences connected to an asylum seeker’s fears of 
persecution are not to be adduced in appeal unless they were previously raised 
with the IND, as the Council can only review matters that were raised during that 
original assessment undertaken by the IND.41 
The Raad van State has held that a medical report which is drawn up after a 
decision has been made but could have been drawn up earlier in the procedure is 
not new and will not be taken into account.42 This can be problematic when an 
asylum seeker has not disclosed traumatic events, such as torture, because they 
were traumatized and have thus had their application declined but could prove the 
                                                
37 Spijkerboer, above n 40, at 55-56. 
38 At 56. 
39 Thomas Spijkerboer “Subsidiarity and ‘Arguability’: the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Case Law on Judicial Review in Asylum Cases” 21 IJRL 2009 48 at 58. 
40 General Administrative Law Act, Article 4:6(2). 
41 Council of State, decision no. 200202452/1, Decision of 16 July 2002. 
42 23 April 2002, 200201688/1. 
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existence of torture by way of medical examination. Janus Oomen suggests that a 
medical report, which can often be produced much after the asylum seeker has 
been interviewed, and is then needed for new documentation to have their claim 
re-examined, is too late and should be done when someone initially enters the 
country so that an asylum seeker does not have to give account of their trauma but 
that there is a medical report which can give independent proof of this.43 He posits 
that ninety percent of those who had been refused asylum wrongly, a medical 
examination at the definite hearing, or second interview, would have contributed 
to the proper decision.44  
V. Special Procedure 
A. EU law on accelerated or special procedure 
The Procedure Directive permits the use of special or accelerated mechanisms for 
processing applications, and these mechanisms are governed by Articles 23-35 of 
the Directive. Articles 23, 24 and 28 allow accelerated procedures or special 
procedures for a wide range of applications such as manifestly unfounded claims 
or for applications made at the border. In fact, the Directive allows the use of 
accelerated procedures in fifteen specified cases, but leaves it open to Member 
States to apply those procedures in other cases if they should wish to which has 
made the Directive less precise in directing when such an accelerated procedure 
might be appropriate.45 Member States are thus left with considerable discretion 
on when to use accelerated procedures.  
The starting point is that all applications must be considered in accordance with 
the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II of the Directive.46 Chapter II 
provides the basic safeguards that a procedure must comply with. One such 
safeguard is that the procedure is to be concluded as early as possible but without 
prejudice to an adequate and complete examination.47 Special procedures are 
allowed but this assessment still requires applications to be considered consistent 
                                                
43 Oomen, above n 22, at 255. 
44 At 253. 
45 Peers and Rogers, above n 13, at 376. 
46 Procedures Directive, Article 23(1). 
47 Procedures Directive, Article 23(2). 
14 
 
with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II, like Article 23(1).48 Even 
though it is clear from the Procedures Directive that all procedures enacted by 
Member States must comply with the basic principles and guarantees of the 
Directive, it is less clear when it is appropriate for such special procedures to be 
used. Article 23 does not give an exhaustive list of when accelerated procedures 
might be used, but rather states that Member States may do so in any 
application.49 This is due to the fact that the Directive is concerned for a great deal 
with enabling Member States to deal quickly and efficiently with inadmissible and 
unfounded cases. Such special procedures can indeed provide for more efficient 
and effective decision-making in asylum cases. However, to the extent that this is 
actually the case can be much inhibited by deficient national asylum procedures.50  
A noticeable absence from the Directive is also what would constitute a 
“regular” procedure. Rather, the lack of any guidance on this has meant that 
divergence in practice has surfaced, as is exemplified by the Dutch special 
procedures, which was something that the harmonization process specifically 
sought to eliminate. The Directive is therefore problematic in the extent to which 
it allows proceedings and appeals to be accelerated and standards in relation to 
procedure to be lowered in special circumstances.51 The Committee of Ministers, 
as part of the Council of Europe, have issued guidelines on accelerated procedure, 
but does not state any helpful guidance on what the time limit should look like. It 
simply states:  
The time taken for considering an application shall be sufficient to 
allow a full and fair examination, with due respect to the minimum 
procedural guarantees to be afforded to the applicant.52  
Such an abstract statement is not particularly helpful in interpreting the Directive 
and provides no further guidance. It is a missed opportunity to set out well-
defined standards and fails to exceed a simple restatement of existing procedure in 
                                                
48 Procedures Directive, Article 23(3) and (4). 
49 This is also in accordance with Preamble (11) to the Directive, which restates the proviso in 
Article 23. 
50 Peers and Rogers, above n 13, at 385. 
51 At 393. 
52 Committee of Ministers, Guidelines on human rights protection in the context of accelerated 
asylum procedures (Council of Europe, 1 July 2009) at IX(2). 
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a weaker form.53 Thus, the Directive provides little guidance as to what 
constitutes an accelerated or special procedure or in which circumstances its use 
might be appropriate. 
B. Special procedure in Dutch asylum law 
Under Dutch law, there is a new asylum procedure which came into force on 1 
July 2010. Now there is the AA procedure (Algemene Asielprocedure) under 
which a claim is decided in eight days, and can be prolonged for a maximum of 
six days if necessary.54 Most claims will be processed under the AA procedure as 
it is the procedure used at the border at all reception centres. If the IND cannot 
make a decision within that timeframe, the asylum seeker is transferred to the 
extended procedure under which a decision can be given within six months of 
receipt of the application, which can be extended in some cases.55 It has also 
instituted a rest period of six days before the asylum seeker is to be interviewed or 
the asylum procedure formally starts. This is a marked improvement from what 
the accelerated procedure prior to 2010 was which meat a case was decided within 
48 procedural hours.56  
The special procedure usually means a determination on an application will be 
made after just four days from the start of the procedure, which starts after six rest 
days. On the first day, the asylum seeker undergoes their first interview, followed 
by a day to discuss with their lawyer, a further interview on the third day and 
another day allowed for consultation with a lawyer.57 On the fourth day, the 
asylum seeker has to review a report of the interview, the letter of intention, which 
sets out any reasons for the refusal of the asylum claim, as well as file for any 
corrections or additional information or respond to the letter of intention.58 This 
short timeframe becomes problematic, as Joukje van Rooij points out, when 
                                                
53 Nuala Mole and Catherine Meredith Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Council of Europe, 2010) at 106.  
54 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights “Country Factsheet Netherlands” (2010) EDZ 
Archi Dok Europäische Dokumentationszentren – Archivierung von EU-Onlinedokumenten 
<http://www.pedz.uni-mannheim.de/daten/edz-b/ebr/10/asylum_factsheet_Netherlands_en.pdf> at 
4. 
55 Aliens Act 2000, Article 42(1). For the exceptions to this Article, please see Articles 42(4) and 
43 of the Act. 
56 Aliens Decree 2000, Article 3.110 [1.2]. 
57 Dutch Council for Refugees, “General Asylum Procedure From Day to Day” (2014) Dutch 
Council for Refugees <https://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/node/228259>. 
58 Aliens Decree 2000, Article 3.118 [2]. 
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establishing rapport or a relationship of confidence with a lawyer nor does it allow 
sufficient time for a proper review of the application.59 Complex admissions 
cannot really be investigated further and there is also a real danger that the asylum 
seeker does not comprehend the significance of the interviews until they are 
over.60 Consequently it becomes questionable whether the substantive quality of 
decisions is not compromised and instead more importance is attached to 
efficiency.61 At present, there is little information available about whether the 
quality of decision making and so it is uncertain whether the faster procedures 
have had a detrimental impact on the examination of asylum applications.62 
However, as these procedures have becomes the norm rather than the exception, 
any substantial examination of a claim is most likely to be very limited.  
C. Article 3 ECHR and time limits 
The issue raised with such quick procedures for assessment is whether such a time 
limit can be strictly interpreted or whether the substantive merit of a claim may 
warrant further time to consider the claim. The Netherlands arguably has asylum 
processes which are very much focused on procedural compliance. As such, it is 
arguable that such an approach has the potential to dispel genuine asylum 
applications which could breach an individual’s right under Article 3 of the 
ECHR. 
The European Court of Human Rights initially placed more emphasis on the 
asylum seeker having followed the correct procedure. In 1998 the European Court 
of Human Rights took such a strictly procedural approach. In Bahaddar v the 
Netherlands it was held that the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in 
domestic law should normally be complied with as they allow the Member State 
to discharge their case load in an orderly manner and only where there are special 
circumstances may this obligation to comply with the rules be absolved, but this is 
                                                
59 Van Rooij, above n 18, at 6.  
60 Human Rights Watch, above n 29, at 10. 
61 H.B. Winter and K.F. Bolt “Quality in Dutch Asylum Law: From ‘Strict but Fair’, to ‘Fast but 
Good’?” in K.J. de Graaf, J.H. Jans, A.T. Marseille & J. de Ridder (eds) Quality of Decision-
Making in Public Law: Studies in Administrative Decision-Making in the Netherlands (Europa 
Law Publishing, Groningen, 2007) at 136. 
62 Idem at 149. 
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dependent on the individual facts of a case.63 In the Netherlands, the Raad van 
State considers Article 4:6 of the Awb to be such a rule.64  
A more substantive approach has since been favoured the European Court of 
Human Rights. In 2000, the court in Jabari v Turkey held that the automatic and 
mechanical application of a very strict five-day registration period for an asylum 
claim as required by Turkey would be at odds with the protection of the 
fundamental principle contained in Article 3 of the Convention.65 In that case, Ms. 
Jabari argued that her expulsion back to her home country would subject her to 
the possibility of being stoned to death for having committed adultery and that 
this would be contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. Her claim had been rejected as 
she had not registered her claim within five days of arriving in Turkey, which she 
was procedurally required to do. The court upheld her claim under Article 13 
which guarantees the right to an effective remedy. The Court considered that as 
expulsion is of such an irreversible nature given the harm that might occur if Ms 
Jabari was to return to Iran, combined with the importance afforded to Article 3, 
an effective remedy under Article 13 necessitates independent and rigorous 
scrutiny of a claim where there are substantial grounds of a real risk of treatment 
that are contrary to Article 3 and the possibility of suspending the implementation 
of the measure impugned.66 Thus, generally speaking, the European Court of 
Human Rights has prevented procedural deterioration and insists instead on 
vigilant factual assessment of individual cases.67  
Unfortunately, the Netherlands has refused to implement a more substantive 
approach to asylum claims. As Van Rooij points out, the Raad van State rejects an 
appeal on grounds of Article 3 ECHR without rigorous scrutiny but merely by 
way of reference to Article 4:6 of the Awb, Article 83 of the Aliens Act or Article 
3.119 of the Aliens Decree and by doing so the Netherlands maintains the same 
erroneous position as the Turkish court in Ms. Jabari’s case.68 Instead, the 
reasoning as suggested in Jabari is of much more persuasive nature as the 
application of unduly strict time limits or procedure should constitute a breach of 
Article 3 in an individual case. 
                                                
63 ECHR 19 February 1998, Reports 1998-I at [45]. 
64 Raad van State 5 March 2002, JV 2002/125, NAV 2002/129 and AB 2002, 169. 
65 ECHR 11 July 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-VIII at [40]. 
66 At [50]. 
67 Costello, above n 28, at 5. 
68 Van Rooij, above n 18, at 26.  
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VI. Right to Appeal 
A. Dutch review procedure for asylum applications 
Administrative bodies are under the obligation to give reasons for a decision when 
that decision is communicated.69 The General Administrative Law Act also 
requires that if a decision can be appealed, it must be mentioned when the 
decision is given, as well as any time limit within which the appeal must be 
lodged and with which authority or body it must be lodged.70 For asylum 
applications, Article 69(1) of the Aliens Act states the time limit for filing a 
review of decision is four weeks for those applications which have been assessed 
under the extended procedure, and the right to submit for a review under the AC 
procedure is one week pursuant to Article 69(2) Aliens Act. As previously stated, 
most applications are dealt with under the AC procedure, and so it will be more 
likely that an asylum seeker will have only one week to file for review after a 
decision has been given. An asylum seeker can appeal under administrative law 
by way of judicial review – firstly to a district court followed by a subsequent 
right of review to the Council of State.71 The asylum seeker therefore does not 
have a right of appeal as such. Judicial review is only concerned with whether the 
correct processes were used, and whether they were used properly, rather than a 
review of the outcome of the matter.  
There are also issues with the type of review that is applied to these types of 
applications. The type of review is, as stated, not an appeal and only a review of 
the applicable procedure, with little consideration of whether the claim to asylum 
is in fact genuine. In particular, it is established fact that judicial review by the 
Regional Court and the Administrative Jurisdiction Division in administrative law 
appeal proceedings under the Aliens Act 2000 only addresses whether the 
executive authority concerned has exercised its administrative powers in a 
reasonable manner and, in the light of the interests at stake, could reasonably have 
taken the impugned decision (marginale toetsing).72 This means only a marginal 
scrutiny will be applied when assessing the facts of the case, including the 
credibility of the claim.  
                                                
69 General Administrative Law Act 1994, Article 3:47(1). 
70 General Administrative Law Act, Article 3:45.  
71 Aliens Act 2000 (Netherlands), s 71(1) and (5). 
72 Afif v The Netherlands ECHR 24 May 2011, Application No. 60915/09 at [28]. 
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Such narrow examination can become problematic in asylum applications 
where there is a real claim of asylum present, but procedural requirements have 
been abided by, which means that the claim could still be rejected. This means 
that claims can be dealt with quickly on appeal as the court or Council of State 
will not concern itself with the actual claim of asylum itself, but rather examines 
how the IND undertook its examination of the claim. However, such an approach 
clearly risks some legitimate claims to be rejected, leaving with the asylum seeker 
with no other avenue of redress at the national level. This means that the Council 
of State as a final resort of appeal presents a “strikingly restrictive cast to Dutch 
asylum law”.73 Of particular concern is when an asylum seeker has also had to 
submit their application using the accelerated procedure. This has the potential for 
inappropriate determination of a claim if a claim involved complex legal or 
factual issues or severe trauma, which can only be given brief consideration in the 
accelerated procedure, and given the limited scope of judicial review; there is 
little hope of sufficient redress through this process.74 This approach taken by the 
Dutch authorities to only apply marginal judicial review of a decision seems to go 
against the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights in respect of 
Article 3 and 13, which focuses more on the substance of an application.  
B. Article 13 ECHR 
Article 13 of the ECHR provides for the right to an effective remedy at the 
national level by stating that if an individual’s rights under the Convention are 
violated, that person should have an effective remedy before a national authority. 
Of course, in the context of asylum claim, the asylum seeker will normally argue 
that the breach they require an effective remedy for is Article 3 of the ECHR. The 
two rights are thus very much linked in the context of asylum claims. As such, the 
Court in Jabari v Turkey has held that the same “rigorous scrutiny” that is 
required when examining a breach of Article 3 is also applicable to Article 13.75 
It must be noted that the European Court of Human Rights does not require the 
appeal process to necessarily be dealt with in the courts. The court in Conka held 
that such appeal does not need to be before the courts but can be before national 
                                                
73 Human Rights Watch, above n 29, at 2.  
74 Idem. 
75 Jabari v Turkey, above n 67, at [50]. 
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authorities.76 As such, the Dutch approach to refer any appeals to judicial review 
in the district court and to the Council of State appears to be compatible with EC 
case law. However, what is clear is that when appeals are not examined in the 
courts, it will be relevant what remedy they can provide and whether this is 
sufficient. It is clear from the case law that judicial review is considered to be an 
effective remedy.  
However, is the Dutch system of marginal judicial review truly capable of 
satisfying the “rigorous scrutiny” as was prescribed in Jabari? The court appears 
to have allowed Member States to develop systems which would fall short of such 
a system. Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands has held that the remedies under Dutch 
judicial review were adequate as they were capable of providing the necessary 
remedy.77 Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has expressly accepted 
a system of judicial review that is used in the United Kingdom which applies a 
scrutiny that is less intense than that which the Court might use itself.78  
When the Court is concerned with determining any liability of a Member State 
under Article 13 
Appeals procedures in regards to asylum applications are crucial to the safety and 
acceptability of any system purporting to provide protection. As Peers and Rogers 
state, the adequacy of procedures is key to a fair system of asylum procedure in 
Europe.79 However, it has become part of a European trend on the part of Member 
States to avoid having to examine the substance of asylum applications by way of 
procedural sophistication, which restricts the scope of examination as much as 
possible and leaves the substantive examination to the European Court of Human 
Rights.80 Yet the European Court of Human Rights, as it is an organ of appeal 
subsidiary to that of national systems, should not apply scrutiny that has not been 
raised at the national level or exceed such scrutiny – otherwise it is in danger of 
becoming a court of first instance.81 Such a state of affairs is unsatisfactory as 
States must take the responsibility for examining the substance of an application, 
and should not leave it in those cases that come to appeal at the European level. 
Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights cannot rewrite national law on 
                                                
76 Conka v Belgium ECHR 5 February 2002, Application No. 51564/99 at [13] and [79]. 
77 ECHR 11 January 2007, Application No. 1948/04. 
78 Spijkerboer, above n 40, at 66.  
79 Peers and Rogers, above n 13, at 384. 
80 Spijkerboer, above n 40, at 49. 
81 At 51. 
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administrative law in this regard as this would be contrary to its subsidiary role 
and instead can only scrutinize the way in which the procedure was applied in the 
Member State’s decision to deport, and cannot occupy itself with the act of 
deportation itself.82 This leaves a considerable gap between case law of the 
European Court which cannot question the decision to repatriate and national 
practice which similarly does not look at the decision itself but applies only 
marginal review of the procedure. Therefore, in order to satisfy Article 13, the 
body considering the appeal of a claim must consider the merits of that claim, 
should provide for the possibility of suspending any deportation order and it 
should not be constrained by a restrictive time limit within which the application 
must be lodged.83 
 
C. Automatic suspensive effect  
The Procedures Directive appears to allow for non-suspensive appeals which 
would allow an asylum seeker to be deported from the Member State before their 
appeal has been heard. Article 39(3)(b) provides that the possibility of legal 
remedy or protective measures does not necessarily have to have the effect of 
allowing applicants to remain in the Member State concerned pending its 
outcome. As such, there is no real right under the Directive providing for any 
suspensive effect of deportation if an asylum seeker has filed for an appeal of the 
refusal of their application. 
 
1. Non-suspensive effect of deportation under the Aliens Act 
Under Article 61 of the Aliens Act, the submission of a review of decision on an 
asylum application will not suspend the obligation on the asylum seeker to leave 
the Netherlands of their own volition. For the purposes of immigration, an asylum 
seeker has to leave the country within four weeks after their lawful residence has 
ended.84 However, in the asylum context the asylum seeker must leave 
immediately upon the rejection of his or her application during the procedure at 
the application centre and when he or she has submitted a previous application for 
                                                
82 At 68. 
83 Mole and Meredith, above 54, at 124. 
84 Aliens Act 2000, Article 62(1). 
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asylum.85 Only if an application has been considered under the extended asylum 
procedure is the operation of an order on a residence permit suspended until the 
time limit under which an appeal must be lodged has expired, or if it has been 
lodged, until a judgement is given.86 Under the AC procedure, however, no such 
automatic suspensive effect will take place which is provided under Article 82(2) 
of the Aliens Act. However, the asylum seeker does have a right to submit a 
request for an interim permit to suspend their removal until a decision has been 
made on appeal under Article 78 of the Aliens Act.  
2. Non-suspensive effect and the European Court of Human Rights 
In contrast to the Procedures Directive, the European Court of Human Rights has 
stated that in the review of rejection of an application for asylum, a non-
suspensive effect is invoked in respect of any appeal against a decision of 
expulsion where Article 3 could be invoked.87  
The Court has held that a system of separate applications to the courts, meaning 
that suspension of an application of an expulsion order after a separate application 
to the courts, was in breach of Article 13.88 However, it has now clearly been 
established that where the applicant seeks to appeal a decision on their expulsion, 
a remedy will only be effective if it has suspensive effect.89 It is not sufficient to 
point to established practice that expulsion will only occur after a domestic court 
has decided whether or not to apply suspensive effect to an application.90 
Pending the examination of an application expulsion must not occur as otherwise 
their human rights could be irreparably violated, and thus that person has a right 
to temporary stay up to the first decision at issue.91  
Conka v Belgium held that Article 13 of the ECHR will be breached if a national 
authority carries out an expulsion prior to any determination of whether that 
                                                
85 Article 62(3)(c). 
86 Article 82(1). 
87 For instance, see Jabari v Turkey at [50] or Conka v Belgium at [70]-[71]. For citation, please 
see above n. 67 and n. 78, respectively. 
88 Conka v Belgium, above n 78. 
89 NA v United Kingdom ECHR 17 July 2008, Application No. 25904/07 at [90]. 
90 Spijkerboer, above n, at 72. 
91 Ralf Alleweldt “Protection Against Expulsion Under Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights” (1993) 4 EJIL 360 at 375.  
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expulsion would be in breach of the ECHR and in this case the Belgian procedure 
which denied suspensive effect was in particular in breach of Article 13.92 
VII. Conclusion 
Dutch asylum procedure highlights the serious discrepancies between State 
practice, EU law and EU case law; none of which align or complement each other 
where necessary. The current system has allowed national systems to emerge that 
enact legislation seemingly contrary to case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The Court arguably favour examining an application for its merits and 
substance, as opposed to asylum procedures such as that of the Netherlands, 
which requires its procedures to be followed strictly with little consideration of 
the substantive merit of a claim.  
As previously stated, the Directive was enacted to provide minimum 
procedural safeguards and to provide a step in the direction of a common asylum 
procedure. However, due to a lack of guidelines and clarity on certain key issues, 
State practice has been allowed to diverge, making a uniform system unworkable 
as States have retained considerable discretion to enact legislation according to its 
own interpretation of the Directive. The Netherlands has used this discretion in an 
attempt to decrease the numbers of asylum seekers coming to its borders, so it 
enacted strict procedures with a focus on meeting procedural deadlines, with little 
room for exceptions or special circumstances, and this system can present a 
serious risk of a breach of Article 3 ECHR in individual cases where a person is 
deported to their home country where they still have a real risk of ill-treatment. 
The procedure currently in place for interviews reveals what important gaps 
have been left by Member States to fill, such as how an interview is conducted 
and what officers are expected to be trained and experienced in. There can only be 
two interviews and in some cases, such as when an asylum seeker is scared, 
ashamed or too traumatized to be able to recount the full story so quickly upon 
arrival into the country, is problematic in itself. This area is one in which EU case 
law has been very different, notably with allowing contradictory statements. There 
are also very limited grounds for subsequent applications to be made and the 
                                                
92 Conka v Belgium, above n 78.  
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‘new’ evidence test is too strictly applied and has the potential to exclude 
evidence which should rightly be considered in a determination. Furthermore 
there is the use of special procedures in most asylum applications, which allow for 
faster determination of a claim. Although this will surely be efficient and helpful 
in a large proportion of cases, there is not enough guidance on when that 
procedure is not suitable and instead it has become the procedure under which 
claims are nearly always automatically assessed. Most notably, however is the 
right to appeal. Under Dutch law there is only a marginal judicial review applied 
to these cases which stands in stark contrast to EU case law which calls for 
“rigorous scrutiny” to be applied to cases where Article 3 might be at risk of being 
breached. Furthermore, EU law has ruled that the decision of expulsion of an 
asylum seeker awaiting appeal is to have suspensive effect, yet the Netherlands 
has no such requirement in the majority of cases.  
Therefore, there have been huge gaps left in what kind of procedure Member 
States should enact and what principles they should be based on. These are gaps 
that the Directive cannot fill as it is too ambiguous; nor can they be supplemented 
by EU case law and state practice as it is conflicting. Perhaps if there is a desire 
for a common European asylum system, an overhaul of current legislation is 
required to provide clearer guidelines.  
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